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Foundational consequentialists hold that the ranking of outcomes (or possible worlds) 
in terms of their goodness is at the foundation of all moral assessment. They hold that 
moral assessments of right and wrong acts, good and bad rules, virtuous and vicious 
character traits, etc. are all ultimately a function of how outcomes rank. But founda-
tional consequentialists disagree on what is to be directly evaluated in terms of this 
ranking of outcomes, which is to say that they disagree on what the primary evaluative 
focal points are.  Act-consequentialists hold that there is but one primary evaluative 1
focal point: acts. They evaluate acts in terms of how their outcomes rank (the higher 
ranked the outcome, the morally better the act) and then evaluate everything else in 
terms of the morally best acts. Thus, the morally best rules are those that, if internal-
ized, would most reliably lead to the performance of the morally best acts. Rule-conse-
quentialists, by contrast, take rules to be the sole primary evaluative focal point. They 
evaluate rules according to how their outcomes rank and then assess everything else in 
terms of the morally best rules. So the right acts are those that conform to the morally 
best rules (Hooker 2000). And in contrast to both act- and rule- consequentialists, 
global consequentialists hold that there are multiple primary evaluative focal points, as 
they refuse to privilege the moral assessment of any one type of thing and hold instead 
that we are to evaluate everything under the sun—including acts, rules, beliefs, inten-
tions, character traits, and even eye color—directly in terms of how their outcomes 
rank (Pettit and Smith 2000).  
In this paper, I’ll be concerned with only a subclass of foundational consequential-
ist theories: those that take acts to be among the primary evaluative focal points. This, 
of course, includes act-consequentialism, but it also includes consequentialist theories, 
such as global consequentialism, that hold that acts are but one of many primary evalu-
ative focal points. Thus, the subclass that I’ll be concerned with excludes only those 
foundational consequentialist theories, such as rule-consequentialism, that deny that 
acts are to be evaluated directly in terms of how their outcomes rank. I’ll call such the-
ories indirect foundational consequentialist theories, and, correspondingly, I’ll call the 
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theories that I’ll be concerned with direct foundational consequentialist theories. I’ll ar-
gue that direct foundational consequentialist theories should evaluate acts in the con-
text of the agent’s background attitudes, where an attitude (such as a belief, a desire, or 
an intention) counts as a background attitude with respect to S’s φ-ing if and only if it 
is some attitude other than the intention of S to φ. I’ll argue that we need to consider 
the agent’s background attitudes, because, as I’ll show, whether S’s φ-ing will have 
good or bad consequences often depends on what background attitudes she has. Ulti-
mately, then, I’ll be arguing that the primary evaluative focal point should be a com-
pound of acts and attitudes and not simply the acts themselves. If I’m right, direct 
foundational consequentialists should accept a new kind of consequentialism, which I 
call attitude-consequentialism. 
But before we can get to the importance background of attitudes, there are a cou-
ple of questions to address first. One such question is whether we are to evaluate all 
acts, or only a subset of acts, in terms of their consequences. For even if we’ve settled 
on the idea that acts are to be among the primary evaluative focal points, that doesn’t 
necessitate our holding that every act is to be evaluated directly in terms of how its 
outcome ranks. Indeed, I’ll argue that we should reject this view. In any case, there are 
a number of different views for us to consider. The view that I think we should reject—
the view that we should, for every act, assess it directly in terms of the goodness of its 
consequences—is  !
Act-Consequentialism: For any act φ that is available to S, it is permissible for S to 
φ if and only if, and because, there is no available alternative act ψ such that S’s 
ψ-ing would produce more good than S’s φ-ing would.   2!
This view is problematic, as it conflicts with a very plausible principle of deontic 
logic and, as a consequence, implies that an agent can, through no fault of her own, be 
under a set of obligations that it is logically impossible for her to jointly fulfill. This 
principle of deontic logic holds that if S is obligated to perform both A1 and A2 (e.g., to 
both speed up and change lanes) then S is both obligated to perform A1 (to speed up) 
and obligated to perform A2 (to change lanes). More generally and formally, the princi-
ple is 
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 The variables ‘φ’ and ‘ψ’ range over individual acts (e.g., pushing the red button), conjunctive acts 2
(e.g., pushing both the red and green buttons), and sets of actions (e.g., performing all the individual ac-
tions involved in earning a PhD). This is important because an adequate moral theory must tell us not only 
both whether it is permissible to take Drug A at t1 and whether it is permissible to take Drug B at t2, but 
also whether it is permissible to perform the set of acts consisting of taking both Drug A at t1 and Drug B 
at t2. Given the way Drug A and Drug B interact with each other, it may not be permissible to perform this 
set. 
!
Distribution: SO(A1, A2, …, & An) → [SO(A1), SO(A2), …, & SO(An)], where 
‘SO(x)’ stands for ‘S is obligated to perform x’. !
To illustrate how act-consequentialism’s verdicts can conflict with this principle, 
consider the case of Professor Procrastinate (Jackson and Pargetter 1986, p. 
235). He receives by email an invitation to write a book review. If he were to accept the 
invitation and write the book review, this would be best for all concerned, as he’s the 
best person for the job. Second best would be his not accepting the invitation, as the 
journal would then get the next best person to write the review. And worst of all would 
be his accepting the invitation and never writing the review. It is unfortunate, then, 
that Professor Procrastinate is a notorious procrastinator. So although he could accept 
the invitation and write the book review, he would not write the book review even if he 
were to accept the invitation. He would instead end up procrastinating indefinitely, 
never writing the review. 
Should Professor Procrastinate accept the invitation? Act-consequentialism says 
‘no’, for there is an available alternative (e.g., his not accepting) whose outcome would 
be better than that of his accepting. Thus, it is, on act-consequentialism, impermissible 
for him to accept the invitation. Nevertheless, act-consequentialism implies that he 
should accept and write. For this set of actions is available to him and the outcome of 
his accepting and writing would be better than that of any other available alternative 
set of actions.  So act-consequentialism implies both that Professor Procrastinate is 3
obligated to accept and write and that he is obligated to not accept. But it is logically 
impossible for him to fulfill both of these obligations. We should, therefore, reject act-
consequentialism, for we should not accept a view that implies that an agent can, 
through no fault of her own, be under a set of obligations that it is logically impossible 
for her to jointly fulfill.  4
Of course, one may object that if Professor Procrastinate would not accept and 
write even if he were to intend to accept and write, then the set consisting of his ac-
cepting and writing is not available to him. Now I’m quite sympathetic to this worry. 
Indeed, the view that I’ll be arguing for—viz., attitude consequentialism—implies that 
Professor Procrastinate’s accepting and writing is not, in the relevant sense, available 
to him. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which his accepting and writing is available to 
him, and it’s an open question whether this is the relevant sense. So, for now, let me 
just explain the sense in which his accepting and writing is available to him and stipu-
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 Two acts, φ and ψ, are alternatives if and only if φ-ing and ψ-ing are mutually exclusive. 3
 It may not be his fault that he is procrastinator. Indeed, let’s suppose that an evil demon made him 4
this way. 
late that act-consequentialism, as I’ll conceive of it, takes this to be the relevant sense. 
(If you don’t think that this is the relevant sense of ‘availability’, then you should reject 
act-consequentialism and accept a different view, one that denies that this is the rele-
vant sense of ‘availability’—that is, you should accept a view such as attitude conse-
quentialism.) 
To understand the sense in which Professor Procrastinate’s accepting and writing 
is available to him at the time he receives the invitation, note that his accepting and 
writing consists in his performing the following set of actions: replying to the email, 
retrieving the book when it arrives in the post, reading each of its chapters, taking 
notes on them, sketching some ideas for the review, writing a first draft, writing a sec-
ond draft, etc. Call this set ‘φ’. Act-consequentialists, as I conceive of them, hold that 
φ is, as of t, available to S if and only if, and because, there is some schedule of inten-
tions, I, beginning at t such that S would perform all the acts of which φ is composed if 
S’s intentions were to follow I.  And it is in this sense that Professor Procrastinate’s 5
accepting and writing is, as of the time of the invitation, available to him. For there is a 
schedule of intentions, or so I’ll assume, such that Professor Procrastinate would ac-
cept and write if his intentions were to follow this schedule. It’s just that being a pro-
crastinator, he’s never going to form the intention to start reading the book now. He’s 
only ever going to form the intention to start reading the book later.   
Now, apart from rejecting this notion of ‘availability’, which I’m just stipulating is 
the notion of ‘availability’ that act-consequentialism is committed to, the only way to 
avoid the problematic implication that Professor Procrastinate is obligated both to not 
accept and to accept and write is to evaluate only a subset of acts in terms of their con-
sequences and then appeal to something other than their consequences in determining 
the deontic statuses of the other acts. There are generally two approaches, depending 
on whether we are to take minimal acts or maximal acts to be the primary evaluative 
focal point. A minimal act is an act that, once begun, cannot be stopped by its agent 
short of its completion. Examples include all instantaneous acts, such as placing a bet, 
as well as some non-instantaneous acts, such as beheading by guillotine (Sobel 1976, 
p. 198). A maximal act, by contrast, is one such that there is no available alternative act 
that is more specific than it, where one act ψ is more specific than another φ if and only 
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Ross 2012, p. 81.)
if ψ-ing entails φ-ing but not vice versa. Thus, typing the word ‘the’ is more specific 
than typing. And typing the word ‘the’ and then taking a sip of coffee is more specific 
than typing the word ‘the’. An example of a maximal act, then, would be any of the 
maximally-specific ways of acting over the remainder of one’s life.  6
Now, if we make minimal acts the primary evaluative focal point, we’ll need to 
use the following principle to assess non-minimal acts: !
Agglomeration: [SP(A1), SP(A2), …, & SP(An)] → SP(A1, A2, …, & An), where 
‘SP(x)’ stands for ‘S is permitted to perform x’ and where ‘x’ ranges over only 
minimal acts. !
This principle holds, for instance, that if I am both permitted to perform A1 and per-
mitted to perform A2, then I am permitted to perform both A1 and A2. When we assess 
minimal acts directly in terms of the goodness of their consequences and then employ 
agglomeration to assess all non-minimal acts, we get what I’ll call  !
Minimal Act Consequentialism: (1) For any minimal act φ that is available to S, it 
is permissible for S to φ if and only if, and because, there is no available alterna-
tive minimal act ψ such that S’s ψ-ing would produce more good than S’s φ-ing 
would. And (2) for any non-minimal act χ that is available to S, it is permissible 
for S to χ if and only if, and because, every minimal act of which χ is composed 
is permissible.  !
This view is clearly false. I may be permitted to touch the left rail at t1 and also 
permitted to touch right rail at t1, as both acts are in themselves harmless. But it 
wouldn’t follow that I’m permitted to touch both rails at t1, as that, we’ll suppose, 
would result in my death by electrocution. Yet that’s what minimal act consequential-
ism implies. We should, therefore, reject minimal act consequentialism. 
Perhaps, then, we should take maximal acts, not minimal acts, to be the primary 
evaluative focal point. But there are two types of maximal acts to choose from, one ex-
tends the relevant pattern of action across only time and the other extends it across 
both time and individuals. Note that a pattern of action is just a set of actions involving 
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 As defined, minimal acts are not, as the name might suggest, at the opposite end of some spectrum 6
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different time-slice agents, where every discrete act has its own discrete time-slice 
agent such that any two acts performed over different spans of time or by different in-
dividuals have different time-slice agents. And expanding on act-consequentialism no-
tion of ‘availability’, I’ll call a pattern of action realizable by a set of time-slice agents, 
TSA, if and only if, and because, each act of which it is composed is available to some 
time-slice agent who is a member of TSA. Lastly, a pattern of action is maximally spe-
cific if and only if its realization entails the realization of all other realizable patterns.  
As I said, there are two types of maximal acts. First, there are maximal intra-ac-
tions, which are just those maximally specific patterns of action that are realizable by a 
single individual over time. Second, there are maximal inter-actions, which are those 
maximally specific patterns of action that are realizable by the set of all individuals over 
time. This distinction yields two different versions of consequentialism. First, there is  !
Intrapersonal Consequentialism: (1) For any maximal intra-action φ that is realiz-
able by S over time, φ is optimal if and only if, and because, there is no other 
maximal intra-action ψ that is realizable by S whose realization would produce 
more good than the realization of φ would. And (2) for any act χ that is available 
to S, it is permissible for S to χ if and only if, and because, the realization of 
some optimal maximal intra-action realizable by S entails S’s χ-ing.  !
This view is problematic. The problem is that it makes personal identity practical-
ly relevant when it isn’t.  To illustrate, suppose that Professor Procrastinate will un7 -
dergo some psychology-preserving but potentially identity-destroying process (such as 
fission or teletransportation) sometime after he must accept the invitation but before 
he must start writing the review. And, for the moment, let’s just consider the case of 
teletransportation. Do we really need to figure out whether the person who comes out 
of the tele-transporter (call him Post) is the same person who went in (call him Pre) in 
order to determine whether or not Professor Procrastinate should accept the invita-
tion? Intrapersonal consequentialism says that we do. If, on the one hand, Pre and Post 
are both time-slices of the same person (viz., Professor Procrastinate), then intraper-
sonal consequentialism implies that Professor Procrastinate (i.e., Pre) is obligated to 
accept the invitation. For if Pre and Post are both time-slices of Professor Procrasti-
nate, then the pattern of action consisting of Pre’s accepting the invitation and Post’s 
writing the review counts as being realizable by Professor Procrastinate. And if this 
pattern of action is realizable by Professor Procrastinate, then it would certainly be the 
best pattern of action that is realizable by Professor Procrastinate, meaning that Profes-
sor Procrastinate would be obligated to perform any act of which this pattern is com-
!!
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posed. Thus, if Pre and Post are both time-slices of Professor Procrastinate, then in-
trapersonal consequentialism implies that Professor Procrastinate (i.e., Pre) is obligat-
ed to accept the invitation. 
If, on the other hand, Pre and Post are not both time-slices of Professor Procrasti-
nate, if only Pre is a time-slice of Professor Procrastinate, then intrapersonal conse-
quentialism entails that Professor Procrastinate is prohibited from accepting the invita-
tion. In that case, the pattern of action consisting of Pre’s accepting the invitation and 
Post’s writing the review would not count as realizable by Professor Procrastinate. For 
even if Pre were to accept the invitation and intend to write, Post would not write the 
review. So the best that Professor Procrastinate can do is to refrain from accepting the 
invitation. So, if Pre and Post are distinct persons, intrapersonal consequentialism im-
plies that Professor Procrastinate (i.e., Pre) is prohibited from accepting the invitation. 
Thus, on interpersonal consequentialism, we get very different answers as to whether 
Pre should accept the invitation depending on whether Pre and Post are time-slices of 
the same person.  
But what does it matter whether Pre and Post are time-slices of the same person? 
What matters, it seems to me, is whether Pre’s intending to write the review at the 
time of his accepting the invitation will result in Post’s writing the review. If it won’t, 
then it seems that Pre should not accept the invitation. But if it will, then it seems that 
he should accept the invitation even if the person who will later write the review is not 
numerically identical to him. What’s important, then, is whether Post will carry out 
Pre’s intention, not whether Post is numerically identical to Pre. Thus, the problem 
with intrapersonal consequentialism is that it focuses on the irrelevant: namely, per-
sonal identity.   
If we want to avoid this problem and still make maximal actions the primary eval-
uative focal point, we will need to make inter-actions, not intra-actions, the focus. If we 
do, we get  !
Interpersonal Consequentialism: (1) For any maximal inter-action φ that is realiz-
able by the set of all individuals over time, φ is optimal if and only if, and be-
cause, there is no other maximal inter-action ψ that is realizable by the set of all 
individuals whose realization would produce more good than the realization of φ 
would. And (2) for any act χ that is available to S, it is permissible for S to χ if 
and only if, and because, the realization of some optimal maximal inter-action 
realizable by the set of all individuals entails S’s χ-ing. !
This view avoids making moral obligations dependent upon personal identity, but 
it does so at the price of having some very counterintuitive implications. To illustrate, 
consider the following case, which I’ll call The Buttons because it involves two individ-!!
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uals, Coop and Uncoop, each with a button in front of them.  Depending on who 8
pushes his button at t4, the consequences will vary—see Table 1. Assume that the re-
sulting utiles will be evenly distributed over all parties, including both Coop and Un-
coop. Assume that Uncoop is uncooperative (hence, his name) and will not push even 
if he thinks that Coop will push. Coop, by contrast, wants to cooperate but knows that 
Uncoop is unwilling to push.  
  
Table 1  
!
What, then, should Coop do? It seems clear that he should not-push, for the al-
ternative (his pushing while Uncoop not-pushes) would be much worse: 0 utiles as op-
posed to 60 utiles. Yet interpersonal consequentialism holds that Coop should push, 
for all the optimal maximal inter-actions realizable by the set of all individuals (which 
includes both Coop and Uncoop) involve both he and Uncoop pushing. Now, if there 
were some way for Coop to ensure that Uncoop pushes, then it would make sense to 
require Coop both to ensure that Uncoop pushes and to push himself. But, in this case, 
there is no way for Coop to ensure that Uncoop pushes. Indeed, no matter what Coop 
does, Uncoop will not-push. Given this, it seems that Coop should not-push as well. 
And since interpersonal consequentialism holds otherwise, we should reject this view. 
The problem with interpersonal consequentialism, then, is that it requires Coop to 
play his part in the best realizable pattern of action even if the circumstances are such 
that there is no way for him to see to it that this pattern will be realized and playing his 
part under such circumstances would be disastrous for both him and others.  
It seems, then, that what we need is a theory that holds that one is obligated to 
play one’s part in some good pattern of action only if one can see to it that that pattern 
will be realized. To see this, consider that in contrast to Coop, Uncoop can see to it 
that the pattern of action consisting in their both pushing is realized. Since Coop is 
willing to cooperate, he would push at t4 if Uncoop were to promise him at t3 that he 
will push at t4. Thus, Uncoop can see to it that they both push by both promising Coop 
at t3 that he will push at t4 and then pushing at t4. Given this, it seems that Uncoop is 






Coop: Pushes 100 utiles 0 utiles
Coop: Not-pushes 0 utiles 60 utiles
!!
Portmore: Foundational Consequentialism                                                                      Page    of  8 13
 This case is borrowed with revision from Regan 1980, p. 16.8
Now, in The Buttons, Uncoop can see to it that the optimal pattern of action is 
realized by performing certain actions, but sometimes the only way to see to it that the 
optimal pattern of action is realized is by forming certain attitudes. To illustrate, con-
sider what I’ll call The Buttons 2, a case that’s just like The Buttons except that in this 
case Coop will push at t4 if and only if Uncoop desires at t3 to cooperate. And assume 
that Coop will be able to read Uncoop’s mind at t3 to determine whether he has this 
desire. In this case, it seems that Uncoop should desire to cooperate at t3 and push at 
t4. So, in both The Buttons and The Buttons 2, Uncoop can see to it that Coop pushes at 
t4, it’s just that in the former it’s by promising Coop at t3 that he’ll push at t4, whereas 
in the latter it’s by desiring at t3 to push at t4. 
Of course, if cases involving mind reading seem too fanciful to you, then consider 
a variant on the case of Professor Procrastinate, which I’ll call Professor Procrastinate 2. 
The difference between this case and the original is that in this case Professor Procras-
tinate receives two emails. One is from a journal, inviting him to write a book review. 
The other is from his department chair, asking him to commit to a topic for his seminar 
next semester. If he accepts the invitation while intending to respond to his chair with 
a commitment to make the book the topic of his seminar, he will read the book and 
write the review. However, if he accepts the invitation while intending to respond to 
his chair with a commitment to teach his seminar on Kant (a topic over which he tends 
to obsess), he will not read the book or write the review, but will instead obsess over 
how to interpret Kant. Thus, his accepting the invitation to write the book review will 
have good consequences if and only if he intends to respond to his department chair 
with a commitment to teach his seminar on the book. 
What these cases illustrate is that whether or not an agent’s φ-ing would have 
good consequences can depend on what background attitudes she has, or had. (An atti-
tude is a background attitude with respect to S’s φ-ing if and only if it is some attitude 
other than S’s intention to φ.) Uncoop’s pushing at t4 will have good consequences if, 
and only if, he desired at t3 to cooperate. And Professor Procrastinate’s accepting the 
invitation to write the book review will have good consequences if, and only if, he in-
tends to reply to the chair’s email with a commitment to teach his seminar on the book. 
This, I believe, suggests an alternative to all the problematic accounts of the primary 
evaluative focal point that we’ve considered thus far: a compound of both actions and 
their background attitudes.   9
!!
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When we take such a compound of actions and their background attitudes to be 
the primary evaluative focal point, we get  !
Attitude Consequentialism: (1) For any act φ and set of background attitudes B1, 
it is permissible for S to φ in the context of possessing B1 if and only if, and be-
cause, (a) B1 is a permissible set of background attitudes, (b) S would φ if S were 
to intend to φ while possessing B1, and (c) there is no alternative act ψ and per-
missible set of background attitudes B2 (where B2 may or may not be identical 
to B1) such that S would ψ if S were to intend to ψ while possessing B2 and the 
consequences of S’s ψ-ing in the context of possessing B2 is better than the con-
sequences of S’s φ-ing in the context of possessing B1. And (2) it is permissible 
for S to φ if and only if, and because, there is some set of background attitudes 
B1 such that it is permissible for S to φ in the context of possessing B1.  !
 Condition 1a is necessary, for, in general, it won’t be permissible to x and y if it is 
impermissible to y. Thus, it won’t be permissible for S to χ while possessing Bi if it is 
impermissible for S to possess Bi. And we are to assess whether it is permissible for S 
to possess Bi by looking not only at whether it permissible for S to possess each of 
attitudes of which Bi is composed individually, but also at whether it is permissible for 
S to possess all these attitudes collectively—that is, in conjunction with both each other 
and the intention to χ. Thus, a set of background attitudes Bi (that are background to 
S’s χ-ing) is permissible if and only if it is permissible for S to possess all the attitudes 
of which Bi is composed in conjunction with both each other and the intention to χ.  
 Condition 1b is necessary given the need to avoid the possibility that agents could 
be required to form ineffective intentions. And, as we’ve seen from Professor Procrasti-
nate 2, whether an intention (such as the intention to write a book review) will be effec-
tive or not depends on what one’s background attitudes are. If Professor Procrastinate 
intends to write the book review while having the background attitude of intending to 
commit to teaching his seminar on the book, then the intention to write the book re-
view will be effective. But if Professor Procrastinate intends to write the book review 
while having the background attitude of intending to commit to teaching his seminar 
on Kant, then the intention to write the book review will be ineffective. 
 Lastly, condition 1c is needed to make the view consequentialist. And condition 2 
just explains the relationship between the permissibility of the compound of φ-ing in 
the context of possessing B1 and the permissibility of one of its component part, viz., 
φ-ing.  
Having explained attitude consequentialism, I can now proceed to demonstrate 
how it avoids the pitfalls of its predecessors. I’ll start by considering act-consequential-
ism and the (original) case of Professor Procrastinate. Unlike act-consequentialism, atti-!!
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tude consequentialism does not require Professor Procrastinate both (1) not to accept 
and (2) to accept and write. Admittedly, attitude consequentialism, like act-consequen-
tialism, implies that Professor Procrastinate should not accept the invitation, for, even 
in the context of possessing a permissible set of background attitudes, his not accepting 
would have better consequences than his accepting. But, unlike act-consequentialism, 
attitude consequentialism denies that Professor Procrastinate is required to accept and 
write. According attitude consequentialism, an agent can be required to perform a set 
of actions only if there is some permissible set of background attitudes such that she 
would perform that set if she were to intend to do so while possessing those back-
ground attitudes. But the case of Professor Procrastinate is one in which it is stipulated 
that he will not accept and write even if he intends to do so. So, unlike act-consequen-
tialism, attitude consequentialism does not imply that Professor Procrastinate is under 
a set of obligations that it is logically impossible for him to jointly fulfill.  
 Unlike minimal act consequentialism, attitude consequentialism prohibits my 
grabbing both the right and left rails at t1. Grabbing both rails at t1 would have disas-
trous consequences (regardless of my background attitudes) in that it would result in 
my death by electrocution. And, more importantly, there is an alternative (e.g., grab-
bing only one rail at t1) that would, in the context of possessing a permissible set of 
background attitudes, have better consequences. So although attitude consequential-
ism agrees with minimal act consequentialism that I am both permitted to grab the 
right rail at t1 and permitted to grab the left rail at t1, it denies that I’m permitted to do 
both at t1, because, unlike minimal act consequentialism, attitude consequentialism 
eschews the agglomeration principle.  
 Unlike intrapersonal consequentialism, attitude consequentialism is only con-
cerned with whether Pre’s intention to write the review will be carried out by Post, not 
with whether Post is numerically identical to Pre. If Pre’s intention will be carried out, 
then Pre should accept the invitation while having the intention to write the review as a 
background attitude, for, in that case, accepting the invitation will have good conse-
quences. If, however, the intention would not be carried out, then Pre should not-ac-
cept the invitation, for, in that case, accepting the invitation, even while having permis-
sible background attitudes, will have bad consequences. So, unlike intrapersonal con-
sequentialism, attitude consequentialism considers personal identity to be irrelevant. 
What matters is what will happen if Pre accepts the invitation while possessing the in-
tention to write the review. If what will happen is that Post will write the review, the 
Pre should accept regardless of whether or not Pre and Post are time-slices of the same 
person. 
Lastly, unlike interpersonal consequentialism, attitude consequentialism holds 
that agents are required to play their parts only with respect to those patterns of action 
that they can ensure will be realized. Consider again The Buttons, where the optimal !!
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pattern is the one in which they both push. Since Uncoop is going to not-push no mat-
ter what Coop does, thinks, or feels, there is no way for Coop to ensure that the opti-
mal pattern will be realized. So, contrary to what interpersonal consequentialism im-
plies, Coop should not-push, as attitude consequentialism implies. This is best the best 
that Coop can do given that Uncoop is going to not-push. However, attitude conse-
quentialism rightly holds that Uncoop should push. By promising to push while intend-
ing to push, Uncoop can ensure that they both push.  
In conclusion, I think that direct foundational consequentialists should take a 
compound of actions and background attitudes to be the primary evaluative focal point 
and thereby adopt attitude consequentialism.   10!
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